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The U,S.  and European Eanking  Experience
Learn  frorn your  mistakes  but  do not  let
them be  your  only  source  of  knowledge.
--  Anonvmous
Introductlon
In  writing  this  article,  we originally  lntended  to  draw  out  and discuss
lessons  that  Europe  could  learn  frorn banking  experlence  in  the  United  Staces.
ln  analyzing  European banklng,  however,  we deeided  that  U.S.  pollc)makers  had
more  to  learn  from  the  Eufopean experience  than  the  other  way around.  Europe
can sti.Il  learn  one inportant  lesson  from the  U.S.  banklng  experience,
however:  that  government-provided  financial  safety-net  system  can undermine  a
healthy  banking  systeD.
Fewer geographical  restrictions  benefit  banks  by  allowlng  them to  better
diversify  their  asset  portfolios  and reduce thelr  risk  of  failure.  Whereas
European banks  operate  efficiently  both  inside  and outside  national  borders,
the  U.S,  banking  industry  is  highly  fragnented  from  state  to  state  and  is,
consequently,  inefficient.  Despite  Brea!  progress  in  the  Iiberallzation  of
branching  laws  and  inEerstate  banking  laws  recently,  the  charac terizat  ion  of
the  U.S.  banking  industry  still  includes  numerous  small  banks that  operate  in
small  geographic  areas,  hold  undtversified  portfolios  and are  susceptible  to
failure.
European banks  also  denonstraEe  how expanded asset  powers--the  ability
of  banks  uo participate  iu  nonbanking  activi  ties --a11ow  banks  to  diversify
their  sources of  income and reduce their  risk  of  failure.  In  Ehe U.S.,
considerable  reslrictions  exist  on the  nonbankins activities  of  lts  banks.z
And,  although  legislators  and  regulators  are  granting  new  banking  powers  on  a
pieceneal  basis,  a  radical  overhaul  of  product  line  restrlctlons  has  yet  to
occur.
No\dhere  else  are  the  effects  of  undlversified  banking  more  apparent  than
in  Texas.  In  1985,  the  yeax  in  which  che  banking  crisis  in  Texas  began,  the
Houston  netropolitan  area  (population  3.6  nillion)  had  as  many  banks  as  the
enti-re  nation  of  West  Gerrnany (population  61.0  million);  the  greater  Dallas
area  (populalion  3.5  million)  had  nore  banks  chan  France  (population  55.0
million).  More  banks  failed  in  Texas  from  1985  to  1990  (454  banks)  than
existed  in  France,  l,/est  cernany  or  the  United  Kingdorn.
Exacerbating  the  problern  of  Texas'--and  now  the  nation'  s--undiwers  i fied
banks  are  the  perverse  incentives  inherent  in  the  governnent-provided
financial  safety  nets  for  banks  and  other  U.S,  deposltory  institutlons.  From
this  U.S.  experience,  Europe  can  Learn  a  valuable  Lesson,  or  warning:  poorly
constructed  safety  nets  can  reduee  the  incentives  for  and  the  ablLity  of  banks
to  nonitor  their  or^rn  risks  resulting  in  less  stability  overall.
Developrnent  of  U.S.  Banks:  Probtems  from  the  Outset
Problem  one:  Structure  and  Branching
Perhaps  the  most  sLriking  difference  between  European  and  U.S.  banking
is  the  geographical  structure  of  their  respective  domestic  rnarkets.  In
Europe,  a  few  large  banks  with  extenslve  branch  netr^rorks  serve  entire  nations,
And,  with  the  irnpending  changes  in  L992,  European  banks  will  soon  expand
across  national  boundaries.
In  contrast  to  the  European  experience,  the  banking  structure  in  the
Unlted  States  reflects  populist  sentinent  against  large  financlal  institutionsJ
and  a  rnlsplaced  concern  that  compelition  among banks  produces  a  weak  banklng
lndustry,  These  sentiments,  which  developed  in  the  late  lSth  century,  have
persisted  into  the  present  and  are  reflected  ln  national  and  state  banking
regulations.  The  resulc  ls  a  highly  fragmented  banking  systen0  with,  arguably,
no  truly  nationwide  banking  organizations.  Distingulshlng  the  systern  are  the
many  snall  banks  that  operate  in  geographically  isolated  markets.  As  of
September  31,  1990,  there  were  12,383  banks  in  the  United  States  wlth  total
assets  of  nearly  $3  trillion.  Although  the  average  bank  held  $241 mlllion  in
assets,  the  nine  large  rnoney center  banks  bias  this  figure  upwards.  The
nedlan  asset  size  for  a U.S.  bank  was only  $45  rnillion.  Branches  are  still
relatlvely  rare  in  the  U.S.,  with  banks  aweraging  only  5 branches  each.  In
Iieu  of  this,  the  existence  of  5,425  unit,  or  slngle-office,  banks  in  the
United  States  is  hardly  surprising.
A brief  exanination  of  U.S.  history  illustrates  how  the  nation  developed
such  a  fragrnented  or  balkanized  system,  On  two  separate  occasions,  Congress
initiated  nationwlde  banking  when  it  chartered  the  First  and  Second  Banks  of
the  United  States.  The  charters  were  of  linited  duration  (operatlng  fron
1791-1811  and  fron  1816-1836,  respectiwely)  and were  not  renewed.  Both  banks
received  a  monopoly  privilege  to  estabLish  branches  nationwide.  This
privilege  provided  then  rqith  a  conpetitive  advantage  over  existing  state-
chartered  banks,  which  generally  operated  in  a  single  state.  Futthermore,
because  the  U.S.  government  subscribed  a  large  portlon  of  the  capital  of  these
banks,  politics  influenced  bank  appointrnents  and  loan  decisions.  As  a  result,
the  concept  of  natlonwide  banking  suffered  from  guilt  by  associatlon  with  the
real  problems  of  rnonopoly power  and  polltlcal  influence.l4
To  sattsfy  populist  sentiment  against  big,  nationwlde  banks,
geographical  restrLctions  became  a part  of  U.S.  banking  structure  to  Prevent
banks  frou  growing  too  large  and obtaining  undue political  influence.  The
restrictions  increased  uhe difficulty  of  entering  another  bank's  market.
Exlsting  banks,  therefore,  accepted the  restrictions  to  gain  protection  from
new conpetition.  Those who bellewed  that  liniting  conpetition  was effective
in  preventing  bank  failures  also  supported  geographic  restrictions.
State  laws restricting  the  branchlng  of  stace-chartered  institutions
were the  firsc  type  of  geographical  restriction.  Many states  passed laws that
prohibited  or  limited  branching  Eo a srnall geographic  area,  such as a -city  or
a  county.  When Congress  reintroduced  national  bank  charEers  in  L863,  they
prohlblted  the  new national  banks from establishing  branch offices.2
Eventually,  with  the  1933 amendment  to  the  McFadden AcE of  L927,  national
banks  obtalned  the  same branching  privileges  alLowed  state-charcered
institutions  located  in  che sane state.
Over time,  legislative  and judicial  decisions  have eased many of  these
branching  restrictions,  and  the  najority  of  staces  now perrnit  statev/ide  branch
banking.  Still  ,  L4 staLes  perrDit  only  limited  branching  and  3  states  do not
permit  banks to  open branch offices  at  all.3  ln  some  cases,  mul  tibank
holding  companies have  partially  circumvented  state  branching  lalts,  buc  the
muLtibank  holding  conpany structure  is  an  inefficient  substitute  for  a branch
network  (Clatr,  Tucker and Siems, L991).
The second  geographical  restriction  prohibits  banking  organizations  fron
operacing  across  sEate 1ines.  Interstate  banking was pernissible  until  1956,
though  few  ofganizations  were  deweloping  extensive  incerstate  bank  netwofks  at
the  time.a  To cross  state  1ines,  banks  forrned multibank  holdlng  company that5
owned subsidiary  banks  ln  rnore than  one state.  Branching  across  state  lines
was virtually  nonexistent  because  individual  states  deteruined  branching
powers,  and one  state  dld  not  have  the  power  to  authorize  the  operation  of  a
branch  located  in  another  state.  The Douglas  amendnenc to  the  Bank Holding
Company  Act  of  1956 prevented  further  lnterstate  banking,  unless  specifically
permitted  by  state  legislation.
In  L978, Malne became  the  first  state  to  pass leglslation  enabllng
interstate  banking  through  the  rnultibank  holding  company structure.  Since
then,  46  states  and  the  District  of  Colurnbia have  enacted  sone  form  of
interstate  banking  legislation.  Some  states,  howewer, limit  interstate
banking  to  a specific  geographic  region.  Despite  the  prol-lferation  of
enabling  legislation,  nationwj.de  banking  is  not  yet  a  reality.  The typical
lnEerstate  nultlbank  holdlng  company operates  in  only  t\so staies.  More than
80 percent  of  che  153  interstate  bank  holding  companies operate  in  three
states  or  less.  First  Interscate  Bancorp,  Inc.  operates  in  the  largesE  number
of  states  but  stiLl  has banks in  only  fourEeen states.  Even Citicorp,  the
nation's  largest  banking  organization,  has banking  operauions  in  only  ten
states  (Clair,  Tucker and Siens, 199L).5
The primary  cost  of  geographical  restrictions  is  increased  bank risk
caused by  a  lack  of  diversity.  The 470 Texas bank  failures  during  the  1980s
are  classic  examples of  the  cost  of  an undlverslfied  portfolio.  These bank
failures  occurred  while  the  U.S.  banking  industry  was reporting  profits.  This
suggests that,  if  a banking  ortanization  were well  diwersifled  across  the
Unlted  States,  ics  profits  eLser,rhere  could  hawe offset  its  losses  in  Texas,5
By hindering  their  expansion  into  markets  outside  of  their  home state,o
geographical  resErlctions  led  Texas  banks  to  concenLrate  heawily  in  energy
Iending  and  commercial  real  estate  lending.
Problen  Two:  Separacion  of  Banking  and  CoTnmerce
Slnce  1-933, U.S.  bank  regulations  have  restricted  lhe  nonbanking
activities  in  which  banks  may  engage.  States  also  impose  their  own
restrictions  on  state-chartered  banks.  Prior  to  1933,  banking  organizations
could  enter  nonbanking  lines  of  connerce  and  rnany chose  to  do  so.  Comrnercial
fltrns  sirnilarly  conducted  banking  business.  The  typical  organizational
structure  was  a  bank  holding  conpany  with  banking  and  nonbanking  subsidiaries.
The Glass-Steagall  Act  of  L933,  however,  mandated  the  separation  of  cornmercial
and  investmenc  banking  activities.  The  Bank  Holding  Company Act  of  1956
further  prohibited  banks  from  entering  into  other  lines  of  business  that  were
not  "so  closely  related  to  banking  or  managing  or  controlling  banks  as  Lo  be  a
proper  incident  thereto."  Before  this,  bank  holding  cornpanies  owned  such
diwerse  business  lines  as  insurance  underwriting  (lncluding  1ife,  aucornobile,
property  and  casualty)  and  insurance  agencies;  real  estate  development,  safes,
and management;  oil  development;  title  insurance;  metals  manufacturlng;
bottling;  and  cacching,  processing  and  selling  fish  and  fish  products.T
The  current  systern  of  deposit  insurance  is  the  source  of  the  confusion
in  ascertaining  appropriate  bank  powers.  To understand  this,  consider  the
following  hypothetical  case.  Most  people  could  not  fathorn  Lhat,  as  a  matter
of  public  policy,  legislation  should  prevent  grocery  stores  fron  offering
certain  products  because  of  risk  to  thelr  profitability.  lf  the  capital  of
grocery  stores  were  undenrritten  with  public  funds,  however,  the  question  of
whether  the  stores  sold  fresh  vesetables  ot  not  would  becorne  a  natter  of
proper  public  policy.Proponents of  these  restricEl-ons  persist  in  Justlfying  the  action  with
several  arguments.  For  the  sake  of  clarity,  !t  !s  best  to  separate  the
arguxnents that  are  opposed to  nixing  banking  and commerce from  those  that
oppose such  a rnix  given  the  current  structure  of  deposit  insurance.
Historically,  the  argumenc for  separation  has  been based  on potential
conflicts  of  interest  that  can  develop  in  an organization  provlding  both
commercial  and  investment  banking  services.  T'lxe  creation  of  banking/cornmerce
conglomerates  is  often  opposed because  of  the  political  influence  such  a  large
conpany would  wield.  Finally  it  is  suggested  that  the  conmercial  operations
of  such  organizatlons  would  operate  with  an unfair  advantage  over  thelr
conpetitors  that  were  not  part  of  a banking/commerce  conglonerate.
Financial  firrns  are  continualLy  facing  issues  of  conflict  of  lnterest,
but  banks  are  usually  able  Lo resolve  these  problerns  withouL  the  extrene
response  of  exlEing  an entire  segnent  of  the  financial  markets.  Following  the
stock  market crash  of  1-929,  the  Senate held  hearings  on questionable  financial
Plactices  by  banks  and  their  investnent  banktng  afflllates.  Some  problems  did
exist,  but  these  problems  were  connon to  the  entire  investnent  banking
industry  and not  unique  to  the  affiliates  of  commercial  banks.  Consequently,
separation  of  investnent  and conmercial  banking  mandated in  the  Glass-Steagall
Act  of  1933 did  not  el-iminate  these problens,  but  only  lsolated  chem  in  the
securities  industry  (l,Jhite L986).  Furthermore,  banks currently  provide  trust
services  which  create  potential  conflicts  of  interescs  with  other  banking
activity.  Even commercial Lending operations  \rill  create  potential  conflicEs
of  interest  because  of  lending  to  competitive  firms  or  to  firms  that  contract
with  each  other.  The crucial  point  ls  that  banks  find  ways  co  resolve  theseconflicts  of  interests  to  the  satisfaction  of  their  customers  lrithout  exiting
entire  llnes  of  business.
Tte  argument  contended  by  critics  of  expanded  bank  powers  is  that
allowing  banks  to  grok'  into  huge  conglomerates  could  give  them  undue  politlcal
power,  If  the  popul-ist  axgument  is  valid,  however,  iC  is  valid  for  all
industries.  Yet  pollcies  Eo limit  the  growth  of  conglorneraEes  in  other
industries  do  not  exist.8  AIso,  it  is  unclear  lrhether  an  industry  wlth  nany
srnall  firms  but  an  effective  Erade  associacion  has  less  political  clout  than
an  industry  r{'irh  just  a  few  big  firms  (Huertas,  1988).
TtIe  argument  that  comnercial  enterprises  o\,med by  banks  or  thelr  holdlng
companies  would  have  a  unfair  advantage  over  other  competitors  is  typically
based  on  the  idea  chat  banks  have  some degree  of  rnarket  por,rer  and  can  set
prices  on  credit.  If  this  were  true--and  we do  not  believe  it  to  be  so
generally--pol  icy  rnakers  coul-d  better  solve  the  problem  by  rernowing  the
barriers  to  entry  that  provi.de  banks  with  narket  power  in  the  long  run.  The
greater  competition  would  lower  prices  to  all  bank  cusEoners  (Huertas,  1_988).
Further,  arnong the  "closely  related,'  activities  permitted  for  banks  are
nortgage  banking,  data  services,  and  consulting.  If  they  had  an  unfair
advantage,  banks  would  have  driven  thelr  nonbank  conpetitors  out  of  these
markets.  Such has  not  happened,  nor  ls  it  likely  to.
Of  course,  a  cornmercial  enterprise  owned  by  a  bank  rnight  dewelop  an
advantage  because  of  an  econony  of  scope  that  exists  in  providing  both  banking
and  the  cornmercial  operation  within  one  organization.  An  economy of  scope,
however,  is  hardly  an  "unfair"  advantage  and  shouLd  be  encouraged  to  reduce
costs  and  benefit  sociely.v
The current  structure  of  deposit  insurance  can  also  provide  an
exPlanation  of  a  potential  unfalr  advantage  granted  Eo conmercial  enterprises
owned by  banks.  Federally  provided  deposit  insurance  could  be  a  subsidy  that
banks  could  pass  on  to  Lts  conrnercial  operations,  Currently,  however,  l-t  is
likely  that  che value  of  this  subsidy  is  passed  on  to  bank  depositors  and
bortowers  through  the  effect  of  banking  competint  for  their  business.  That
banks  are  fatling  is  some evidence  that  they  are  noE retalning  the  value  of
the  subsidy.  If  the  subsidy  is  passed on currently,  then competicors  of  a
conmercial  operatlons  owned by  a bank  could  obtain  the  benefit  of  the  subsidy
from  other  competing  banks,  In  any  case,  this  problem  is  more an  argtrment for
restructurlng  deposit  insurance  than  preventing  the  rnix of  banking  and
conmerce.
Deposit  insutance  concerns  crop  up  in  other  argunents  against  the  nixing
of  banklng  and  conmerce.  Some  argue  that  a nix  of  the  two  could  result  in
more bank  failures  because banks  rrould  be  able  to  enter  riskier  actlvities.
Such arguments,  however,  ignore  the  value  of  diversifying  the  income  sources
awailable  to  a bank.  Based on modern  portfolio  theory,  even a highly  risky
activity  can be used to  lower  the  variability  of  total  earnings  if  its
covariance  r,/i  th  existing  bank  earnings  is  lor^r  or  negative,e  Furthermore,  it
should  be  clear  to  a1l  that  banks  that  so  desire  can  take  on  sufficient  risk
to  cause  their  fallure  withouc  any nen powers  (I"ihice 1986).
Those who fall  to  see  the  value  of  diversification  often  argue  that
authorities  should prevent  banks fron  enlering  riskler  lines  of  business  if
their  funding  sources  are  federally  insured.  This  argurnent not  only  ignores
the  potential  positive  effects  of  diversification  but  also  drar^'s  a  fine
distinction  between  the  risky  activity  chat  banks  already  undertake  and riskyl-0
activity  they  have  nou  begun.  In  the  extreme,  this  arg\rment  suggests  that
perhaps  banks  should  not  make  1oans,  as  Lending  is  a  risky  actlvity  funded
with  insured  deposits.
Learninq  From  the  European  Experience
The  contrast  between  the  American  and  European  banking  experlence  could
scarcely  be  sharper.  The  panoply  of  branching  restrictions  thaE  characterize
American  banking  ls  generally  unknown  in  Europe,  at  least  for  cornmercial
banks.  What  geographical  restrictions  exist  tend  only  to  cone  into  play  at
national  borders,  and  even  these  restrictions  are  aLready  breaking  down.
European  banking  regulations  also  typically  grant  a  Exeater  array  of
Porlters  to  cornmercial  banks.  Although  a  homogeneous  structure  does  not  exist
across  Europe,  we  can  identify  some  general  izat  ions  .  European  banking  has
conprised  L\,ro  broad  banking  traditions  (Lewis  L991-, p.l),  The universal
banking  tradition  developed  in  Gerrnany  contrasts  with  the  nore  traditional
cormercial  banking  approach  taken  in  the  United  Kingdom.  (The  U.K.  approach
is  closer  to  that  taken  in  the  U.S.,  though  even  the  U,K.  system  is  generally
roore liberal  than  the  American.)  As  1992  approaches,  the  U.K.  and  other
European  countries  seen  to  gravitate  toward  the  universal  banking  system,
Contrary  to  this,  uncil  recently  regulatory  auLhoritles  in  the  U.S.  have
resisted  the  development  of  universal  banking.  Under  Chairman  Greenspan,  the
Federal  Reserve  System has  refaxed  restrictions  on  certain  seeurities
activities  of  conrnercial  banks.  But  the  scope  for  regulatory  relief  is
largely  explolted,  and  further  asset  powets  awalt  congressional  action.  As lire
write,  it  ls  by  no  means clear  whether  the  U.S,  Congress  vlll  voce  enhanced
asset  powers  for  commercial  banks  (Garsson,  1-99L).  Although  the  economic
argu[ents  favoring  a  syslen  of  universal  banking  are  clear,  the  Amerlcanpolitical  system  has  not  learned  the  benefits  to  be  derived  from  the  European
approach  to  banking.  ro
Developments  ln  the  European  reguLaEory  structure  should  foster  further
llberalization  in  banking.  The  principle  of  rnutual  recognition  constitutes
horne country  control  over  banklnt  regulations.ll  This  approach  wlIl  tend  to
cause  financial  enterprises  to  domicile  in  countries  lrith  the  uosE  llberal
banking  regulations.  This  tendency  vzil"],  in  turn,  cause  other  countries  to
reexamlne  their  banking  regulations  and  shape  then  aLong  the  lines  of  those
crafted  by  rnore  liberal  governments.12  The  political  conpetitlon  to  regulate
banking  and  other  financial  firrns  r,rill  generate  greacer  economic  conpetltion
among these  firms.  The continued  liberalization  of  regulations  will  free
firms  to  enter  inco  nevr activities  and  new  areas.
In  the  United  States,  sirnilar  but  more  limited  conpetition  for  banking
exists  \,tithin  each  state,  ln  each  state,  the  state  banking  regulator  competes
with  federal  banking  regulators  for  the  right  to  regulate  banks,  (This
conpetition  between  state  and  fedetal  authorities  constitutes  the  "dual
banking"  system  in  the  United  States.  )  The  absence  of  a  princlple  of  mutual
recognition  in  banking  among  the  states,  however,  severely  limits  the
political  cornpetition.t3  In  America,  the  state  in  which  a  banklng  firu  or
activity  is  proposed  has  the  po\rer  to  dispose  of  the  application.  Each  state
has  the  power  to  erect  barriers  to  entry  and  ]iberalization.  Until  recently,
nost  states  chose  to  exercise  Ehis  po\rer.  It  is  as  if  the  states  were  in  the
situation  of  Europe  before  the  White  Paper.
Contrast  the  situation  in  the  U.S.  to  the  pronise  of  Europe  1992,  which
wlL]  initiate  home country  control  of  diversified  financial  service  firrns.The principle  of  mutual  recognition  will  facilitate  and hasten  the
liberalization  of  banking  regulatlon  cornpared  to  the  slow pace in  the  U.S.
It  is  entirely  possible  that,  in  the  1990s, Europe, or  at  least  the
European  Economic Cornrnunity (EEC),  will  have  freer  trade  in  banking  (and  oEher
services)  than will  the  U,S.  The dtfference  between hone country  control  and
A.nerican-style  banking  regulation  has  potentially  significant  lmplications  for
competiLlon.  In  Arnerica, each stace  can erect  barriers  to  entry  by  "foreign"
banking  firrns.  The principle  of  mucual  recognition  --  an outeone  of  the
Cassis de Dijon  case --  will  preven! this  in  Europe (Price,  p.f3).
Financial  Safety  Nets:  Europe  Take Heed
Although  Europe  ill.ustrates  for  che United  States  the  benefits  of  less
restrictive  banking,  recent  U,S.  banking  performance reveals  one stfong  lesson
for  Europe.  The debacle  in  the  savings  and  loan  industry  is  a product  of  bad
public  policy.  SpecificaLly,  the  Arnerican systen  of  financial  safety  nets
effectively  encouraged excessive  risk  taking  by  depository  lnstitutions.  The
maJor  share  of  the  bLarne  must  go  to  the  system  of  deposic  insurance.
Since  1933,  the  U.S.  governmenc  has underwritten  losses  on deposits  ln
failed  banks.  Set  initially  at  $2,500,  coverage rose  gradually  to  $40,000.
In  L980, congress raised  che limits  ro  $100,000.  wirhin  rwo years  of  raising
the  coverage limits,  Congress gave savings  institutions  greater  asset  por.rers,
Additionally,  Congress accelerated  the  deregulation  of  interest  rates  paid  for
various  categories  of  deposits.
The deregulation  of  deposiu liabilities,  along with  the  higher  coverage
lirnits,  proved  to  be  a  deadly  combination.  Many savings  and  loans  began  to
aggressiveLy  purchase insured  (that  is,  guaranteed)  deposics  to  finance  rapidLJ
growth.  In  too  many cases,  rapid  growth  involved  booking  an unusually  high
percentage  of  bad assets,  and thus  Iosses.  These institutions  learned  to
flnance  past  Losses  and continued  growth  by  operacing  a  Ponzi  scherne  wlth
insuted  deposits  (Kane, 1985, p.  1-59).  Funds to  pay for  today's  deposits
would  coue  from  tomorrow's  deposits.  After  years  of  operating  in  thls  manner  I
some instituti.ons  were  paying  daily  operating  expenses out  of  the  dally  quota
of  new deposits.  In  these  cases,  funds  narlaBers strnply  paid  what  was
necessary  to  raise  the  funds  required  to  keep Ehe doors  open,
Popular  myth blanes  lhe  industry's  losses  on the  new asset  powers
granEed  to  savings  and  loans  in  the  early  1980s.  This  was not,  hovrevef,  the
systenic  problen  in  the  industry.  Sone thrifts  incurred  losses  by  doing  wtrat
they  had  always  done --  financing  long-tern,  fixed-rate  nortgages  l.rith  short-
teru  funds.  Other  thrifts  utilized  new asset  powers to  diversify  their
portfolios,  raising  their  overalf  returns.  Rather,  the  systenic  problem was
the  ability  of  thrlfts  to  finance  a  "go for  broke"  strategy  of  rapld  gtowth
and reckless  risk  taking.  The ability  to  finance  this  growth  was the  outcone
of  deregulating  deposits  and ralslng  coverage  linits  without  addressing  the
rnoraL  hazard  inherent  in  the  deposit  insurance  systern (Kane, 1989).
Commercial banks  have  fared  far  becter  than  the  thrifts.  Even recent
difficulties  in  the  comrnercial  banking  industry  do noc  suggest  that  the
problems  r,ri1l  be  anything  like  those  experienced  in  the  thrift  indus ury.
Superficially,  the  differing  performance  of  the  tvro industries  lends  credence
to  the  idea  that  the  Lhrifts'  enhanced asset  powers  played  a  crucial  role  in
their  subsequenc demise.  (Commercial  banks did  not  gain  significant
additional  assec powers in  the  early  1980s.)  But,  r^rhat  drove  the  thrifts  toL4
"go  for  broke"  was  the  fact  that  so  nany  of  thexn were  a]ready  broke  or  nearly
so.
In  the  l-970s,  high  and  variable  inflation  rates  wrecked  havoc  with  the
traditional  thrift  strategy  of  borrowing  short  and  lending  long  at  fixed  rates
of  interes!.  Awerage  cost  of  funding  rose  above  averate  rates  of  xeturn  in
the  industry.  Hundreds  of  thrifts  were  driwen  into  or  near  to  insolvency.
Regulators  had  neither  the  will  nor  the  means  to  close  all  insolvent
i-nstitutions  (Kane,  1989).  Institutions  with  little  or  no  capital  face  an
alrnost  irresistible  incentive  to  adopt  a high  risk  investnent  strategy.  They
need  to  incur  large  risks  in  order  to  have  a  hope  of  garnering  high  returns,
They  are  willing  to  make the  garnble because,  in  a  system  of  lirnited  liabllity,
there  is  no  downside  risk  once  capital  is  wiped  out.  Finally,  and  cruclally,
the  institutions  can  finance  the  strategy  because  they  are  able  to  issue
llablltties  guaranteed  by  the  gowernmenc.la
lale  are  witnesses  to  the  recent  failure  of  socialist  economies  in  Europe.
The  failure  reveals  the  inpossibility  of  rationalLy  alLocating  resources
rtithout  market  prices  (O'Driscol1,  1-989, pp.  348-49).  In  banklng,  public
policy  has  injected  an  unhealthy  dose  of  socialist  practice  into  allocating
investment  funds.  Blanket  guaranteesr  like  deposit  insurance,  anesthetize
credlt  rnarkets,  dulling  the  senses  to  risk.  With  risk  not  priced,  supervisory
and  regulatory  judgrents  subscitute  for  the  unavailable  inforrna!ion  flows
generated  by  price  signals.  By necessity,  these  judgrnents  are  categorical
rather  than  incremental.  Risks,  returns  and  opportunity  costs  cannot  be
assessed  at  uhe  margin  because  the  market  calculus  is  inoperatlve.  The  risk-
based  capltal  guidellnes  of  the  Basle  Accord  on  Capital  Measurement  and1f,
Capital  Standards  exernplify  what  happens vJhen  we substitute  regulation  for
rr4r  ^e  L  P!  rurrrB.
European  banking  does  not,  of  course,  operace  with  the  same  lnstitutions
and  rules  as  does  American  banking,  It  would  be  understandable  but  unt/lse,
however,  for  Europeans  to  be  srnug about  the  better  performance  of  their
banking  syslen.  European  countries  have  been  gradually  adoptlng  deposlt
lnsurauce  systems.  The  Second  Directive  on  banking  has  called  for
harmonization  of  the  varlous  national  systens.ls
Moreover,  deposit  insurance  is  only  the  forrn  taken  by  the  policy  of
prowiding  financial  guarantees  to  banks.  The  policy  can  and  does  take  many
guises,  In  America,  it  also  appears  under  the  doctrine  lhat  sone  banks  are
"too  big  to  fail."  When such  banks  do become insolvent,  public  policy
dictates  that  the  central  bank  fund  their  continued  operation  until  an
acceptable  resolution  is  devised.  Thls  policy  increases  che  costs  associated
with  the  bank's  failure,  and  shifts  those  costs  frorn  equity  and  bondholders  to
taxDaYers.
With  the  size  of  its  banking  firms,  Europe  is  rnore 1ike1y  to  adopt  a
policy  of  bailing  out  insol-vent banks.  To the  degree they  do so  (or  have
already  done so),  European governments  have  sowed the  seeds  of  funerican-style
banking  problerns.  As we write,  the U.K.  real-estate  bubble bursts.  The
reports  read  like  che earLy  stages of  what happened in  Texas and,  nore
recently,  in  New  EngLand.  If  thj-s assessnent is  accurate,  the  British  at
least  will  be getting  a taste  of  life  in  Da11as  for  the  past  five  years.  In
this  respect  at  least,  DaLlas life  is  besc viewed from a dlstance,
The problero  wlth  governnental  financiaf  guarantees  is  that  they  do not
eliminate  but  only  shift  risk.  In  banking,  they  typically  do so by  shiftingrlsk  from  deposiuors  and,  sonetimes bondholders or  even equity  lnvestors,  to
Eaxpayers.  In  the  process,  they  also  greatly  increase  the  total  amount of
losses  incurred.  They do so because, by  interfering  with  efficient  pricing  of
risk,  financial  guarantees  perrnit  too  rnuch risk  to  be  ineurred  (given  the
expected  returns).  Looking  at  the  Soviet  economy, one marvels  at  how its
agricultural  sector  can  start  with  so much and  end with  so  little.  The same
has  been  true  of  the  Anerican  thrift  industry,  and for  a  similar  reason.  In
each  case,  the  pricing  rnechanisrn  has been rnucked up  as  a matter  of  public
pol lcy .  16
Conclusion
As 1992 approaches, Europe's banking  Liberalization  provldes  a valuable
lesson  for  U.S.  public  policymakers.  The European system offers  a model of
relatively  free  compeLition  in  financial  services  across national  borders.
This  nodel  will  potentially  result  in  a more open market  than  exists  in  the
United  states.
Recent U.S.  banking  experience  unfortunately  also  provides  a  t\,ro-fold
Iesson  for  European policymakers,  Pirst,  insolvent  banks nust  be allowed  to
fail.  Second, private  economic agents nust  be exposed to  losses  from
investinB  funds--whatever  form  that  investnent  takes--in  financial
institutlons.  By encouraging  excessive  risk  taking,  the  Arnerlcan  systern of
deposit  insurance  has  been a  major  contributor  to  the  number of  banking
failures  and  to  the  matnitude  of  the  losses  incurred  in  those  failures.
American  public  policy  towards  banking  and  finance  is  one  idea  that  ought  to




See Clair  and Tucker  for  details  about  the  historical  dewelopment.
In  the  United  States,  a bank  must  recelve  a  charter  from  either  lhe  state
or  federal  goverru0ent,  Those banks  chartered  by  the  federal  government
are  referred  to  as national  banks.  Used in  this  context.  the  teru
national  does no!  indicate  that  these  banks  operate  nalionwide.
North  Dakota  and l,Jyoming  are  both  considered  unit  banking  slates,  but
both  suates  have  passed  lar-rs permitting  the  bank  holding  companies  to
consolidate  their  subsldiary  banks  into  branch  netvrorks.  Colorado  is
considering  but  has  not  yet  passed branch  banking  legislation.
4.  The exceplion  to  this  statement  r,ras the  Transamerlca  Corporation  \rhich
held  the  Bank of  Anerica  and a number of  other  banks  primarily  in  other
rrestern  states  (James  and Janes.  1954).
5. Citicorp  provides  banking  services,  especially  some consumer  products
such  as  credit  cards,  in  staces  r"rhere it  does  not  operate  a  bank  or
branch.  Its  ability  to  provide  full  service  banking,  however,  is  Iirnited
to  those  ten  states,
It  is  inportant  to  note  that  statevride  branching  is  not  sufficient  to
produce  diversified  bank  portfolios.  In  Texas,  many of  the  large  bank
holding  companies  faiLed  despite  their  netlrork  of  subsldiary  banks
l-ocated  throughout  the  state.  To  some degree,  these  failures  reflecCed
poor  lendint  decisions.  But  they  also  reflected  the  difficulty  of
diversifying  the  loan  portfolio  even  in  a  state  as  large  and  as  dlverse
as  Texas.  The problen  is  cornpounded ln  smaller  states  with  less
diversified  econornies.
See U.S.  Congress.,  1955 and Huertas,  1988.  In  the  earliest  developnent
of  bank  holding  companies,  the  banks  were  forrned by  established
nonbanking  enterprises  in  response  to  a  lack  of  banking  services  being
provided  (Hyman,  L975).  It  might  be  argued  that  the  restrictions  on
branching  prevenced  some regions  of  the  country  frorn  belng  well  served  by
banks  and  encouraged  nonbanking  firns  to  establish  banks.
Antitrust  laws  do  exist  to  prevent  rnonopolization  of  an  lndustry,  but
these  larrs  are  not  used  co  prevent  the  establishnent  of  conglomerates.
Pernltting  banks  to  enter  new  markets  and  industries  and  pernltting
nonbanking  firms  to  enter  banking  would  enhance  competition  not  reduce
ir.
7.
White (1986) offers  a hisrorical  example. In  studying  the  securi  t ie s
affiliates  of  commercial  banks  in  the  1920s,  he  found  that  Lhe  addition
of  securities  activilies  to  commercial  banks  raised  the  banks  rate's  rate




1,0.  A  system  of  universal  banking  stl1l  allows  banking  firms  to  limit
Ehemselves  co  traditional  commercial  banking  activities  if  they  so
desire,  Free  competition  allows  for  diverse  organizational  forms  and,  in
large  industries,  one  typically  finds  organizational  heterogenelty.  We
would  be  surprised  if  U.S.-  and U.K.-style  banks  did  not  coexist  r,rith
uniwersal  banks  ln  post-1-992  Europe.  We certainly  see  such  coexistence
in  other  industries,  including  among nonbank  financlal  firms.  If  people
prefer  dealing  with  srnall,  locally  owned operations,  sone  will  surely
Continue  to  opelate.
1L.  "La  beaut6  de  cette  notion  est  sid6rante.  Les  Etats-membres
reconnaissent  sinplement  qu'iLs  essaient  tous  d'atteindre  les  m€mes  buts
en  €dictant  des  normes  nationales  sur  Ia  s6curit€,  l'hygi6ne,  la
satisfactlon  du  consoflunateur,  etc.,  et  ad$ettent  qu'iL  y  a  differents
noyens  d'y  parvenir,  Les  fins  sont  communes, Ies  noyens  ne  le  sont  plus"
(Prlce,  p.1-3)  .
L2.  In  Ehe United  States,  one  sees  this  political  or  regulatory  competition
among staues  in  their  general  laws  of  incorporation,  States  with  liberal
laws,  like  Delaware  and  New Jersey,  have  garnered  a  disproportionate
nunber  of  corporate  headquarters.  This  has  compelled  other  slates  to
liberalize  their  1aws.
13.  This  absence  is  a  great  paradox.  In  alrnost  all  other  areas,  such  a
principle  is  enshrined  in  the  Constitution.  Article  IV,  Section  1  of  the
U.S.  Conslitution  states  that:  "Ful1  Faith  and  Credit  shall  be  given  in
each  State  to  the  public  Acts,  Records  and judicial  Proceedings  of  ewery
other  State.  And  the  Congress  nay  by  general  Laws  prescribe  the  Manner
in  which  such  Aets,  Records  and  Proceedings  shall  be  prowed,  and  the
Effect  thereof."  Section  2  of  the  Article  suates  that:  "The  Ci.tizens  of
each  State  shall  be  entitled  to  all  Privileses  and  lrnrnunities  of  Citizens
in  the  several  States.  "
14,  Strictly  speaking,  the  liabilities  of  the  deposit  insurance  agencies  tnrere
"moral  obligalions"  of  the  federal  government,  but  not  backed  by  its  full
faith  and  credit.  In  practice,  lhis  was a  distinction  vrithout  a
difference.  While  it  might  have  been  1egally  possible  for  the  U.S.
tovernment  to  decline  to  honor  the  obligations  of  the  agencles,  lt  roould
have  been  politieally  irnpossible.  Congress  has  since  clarified  the
government's  intention  to  stand  behind  these  obligations.
15.  See BarthoLornew and Vanderhoff,  1990.  In  some cases '  it  appears  that  the
introduction  of  deposit  insurance  nerely  formalizes  an  inpllcit
gowernrnental  guarantee  of  deposits  (Bartholornew  and Vanderhoff,  pp.9-11).
M.K.  Lewis  has  suggested  to  us  (in  private  correspondence)  that  European
central  banks  have  dellberatel-y  rnade any  financial  guarantee  ambiguous.
By  creating  a  degree  of  uncertainty  about  their  intentions,  the
authorities  have  induced  bankers  to  be  more  cautious  than  they  would  have
been.L9
L6.  The  analogy  between  American  banking  and  social-isE  economies  can
unfortunately  be  exlended  even  further.  Kane  (1985,  p.  23)  has  found
that  'the  federal  government  is  already  the  leading  supplier  of  equlty
funds  to  deposit  instltutions.,,  As  he  aptly  described  the  situation
(Kane,  1985,  p.  5),  there  has  been  ',a de  faeto  uationallzatlon  of  tne
deposit  institution  industry"  in  the  U.S.20
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